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Abstract— The increasing pervasiveness of internet-connected systems means 
that such systems will continue to be exploited for criminal purposes by 
cybercriminals (including malicious insiders such as employees and vendors). The 
importance of protecting corporate system and intellectual property, and the 
escalating complexities of the online environment underscore the need for 
ongoing information security awareness and education training and the promotion 
of a culture of security among employees. Two honeypots were deployed at a 
private university based in Singapore. Findings from the analysis of the honeypot 
data are presented in this paper. This paper then examines how analysis of 
honeypot data can be used in employee information security awareness and 
education training. Adapting the Routine Activity Theory, a criminology theory 
widely used in the study of cybercrime, this paper proposes a conceptual 
Engaging Stakeholders, Acceptable Behavior, Simple Teaching method, 
Yardstick (EASY) training model, and explains how the model can be used to 
design employee information security awareness and education training. Future 
research directions are also outlined in this paper. 
 
Keywords—Culture of security; Cybercrime trends; Honeypots; Information 
security awareness and education training; Routine activity theory  
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1. Introduction 
Information and communications technologies (ICT) form the backbone of many 
aspects of the critical infrastructure sectors, particularly in technologically 
advanced countries such as Australia and Singapore. For example, the moment a 
system is connected to a public facing IP address (cyberspace), the system will be 
probed, scanned or compromised almost immediately, as revealed in a 2014 
study[1]. 
The challenges of securing a corporation’s information security are increasingly 
interdisciplinary and multifaceted, as information security is defined not only by 
people, process and technical perfection but rather by an ability to manage these 
imperfections. In addition, information security threats will continue to evolve 
into new forms. Technical solutions, while effective, cannot provide a 
comprehensive solution [2]. The Australian Signals Directorate[3] noted that  
even the best technical security measures can be defeated by inappropriate user 
behaviour. Some users, in particular individuals and small businesses, are more 
vulnerable due to a general lack of awareness of cyber threats and relatively low 
resources devoted to information security.  
Human factors are likely to remain one of the weakest links in attempts to secure 
systems and networks [4]. Although information security management is 
relatively mature, comprehensive statistics on patterns and trends in malicious 
cyber activities particularly incidents involving private sector corporations, 
remain an elusive goal (e.g. due to unreported and undetected activities) [5].  
One typical information security strategy is to create conditions unfavorable to 
security incidents, for example, by identifying, manipulating and controlling the 
situational or environmental factors to limit the opportunities for offenders to 
engage in criminal behavior. The routine activity theory, for example, explains 
that crime is generally opportunistic, which occurs when a suitable target is in the 
presence of a motivated offender and is without a capable guardian [6]. Therefore, 
to reduce security incidents, one could target each of these areas – (1 and 2) 
increasing the effort required to offend and the risk of getting caught, as well as 
(3) reducing the rewards of offending. One such strategy is employee information 
security awareness and education training (and user education is also one of the 
key cybercrime mitigation strategies identified by the Australian Signals 
Directorate)[7]. 
Employee information security awareness and education are critical in mitigating 
cyber threats as well as maintaining up-to-date knowledge of cybercriminal 
activities and mitigation measures available (e.g. to harden their systems, control 
access to facilities, and deflecting offenders). Major corporations generally 
include information security awareness program in their corporation training. 
Effective awareness and education training can potentially reduce the numbers of 
vulnerable systems that can be exploited. However, fearing negative publicity and 
the resulting competitive disadvantage due to leakage of information about 
security breaches and monitoring metrics, information about such breaches (e.g. 
how they occur and what are the lessons learnt) is generally not shared with most 
employees.  
In addition, post-incident forensic investigations are not generally conducted [8]; 
hence, corporations may not have a complete picture of the security incident. 
Honeypots can be a useful tool to facilitate understanding of attack trends and 
attacker behaviours, as these systems are designed to emulate services of a typical 
server and capture attacker activities.  
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A number of studies [9,10,11] have highlighted the usefulness of honeypots in 
information security education, but they are usually discussed in the context of the 
higher education institution settings (i.e. educating university students) rather than 
in a real-world corporate environment. In this paper, we study the feasibility of 
deploying honeypots with the aim of collecting attacker trends, behaviours and 
activities that can be used in information security awareness and education 
training in a corporate environment.  
Both honeypots in our study were deployed on a low-cost embedded devices in a 
Private University based in Singapore. Applying the Routine Activity Theory, we 
outline an employee information security awareness and education training that 
uses data collected from the honeypots. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our 
experiment setup. Findings from the Dionaea and Kippo were presented in 
Sections 3 and 4 respectively. We then describe how the routine activity theory 
can be used to design employee information security awareness and education 
training in Section 5. The last section concludes this paper. 
2. Experiment Setup 
We set up two honeypots, namely Dionaea [12] and Kippo [13], using Raspberry 
Pi (see Table 1) running on Raspbian, which is a Debian-based operating system.  
Table 1 SPECIFICATIONS 
Raspberry Pi Model B 
Operating System Raspbian 
Processor ARM1176JZF-S 700 MHz 
Graphical User 
Interface card Broadcom VideoCore IV GPU 
RAM 512MB 
Video Out 
Composite (PAL and NTSC), HDMI 
or Raw LCD (DSI) 
Audio Out 3.5mm Jack or Audio over HDMI 
Storage SD/MMC/SDIO 
Networking 10/100 Ethernet (RJ45) 
Low-Level 
Peripherals: 
 8 x GPIO 
 UART 
 I2C bus 
 SPI bus with two chip selects 
 +3.3V 
 +5V 
 Ground 
 
Power 
Requirements: 
5V @ 700 mA via MicroUSB or 
GPIO Header 
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Dionaea is a low interaction honeypot which emulates services in order to collect 
malware targeting protocols such as Server Message Block (SMB). The SMB 
implementation on Dionaea is based on python and SMB emulation is based on 
mwcollectd. Dionaea also supports the uploading of files into the SMB shares, 
and protocols such as: 
 Hpertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) although it does not capture any data 
transmitted via HTTP,  
 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to create directories and allow the uploading and 
downloading of files, 
 Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) for file transfer, Microsoft SQL Server 
(MSSQL), and  
 Voice over IP (VoIP) protocol to capture incoming SIP messages.  
 
We make use of the libemu library [14] in the capturing of malware for our study. 
The medium interaction Kippo honeypot collects information about attempted 
brute force activities targeting SSH services.  
Both honeypots were setup in a network zone protected by the firewall – see 
Figure 1. As both systems are running low interaction and medium interaction 
honeypots, there is minimal risk of either honeypot being used as proxy to 
compromise other connected systems. The binary and logs are sent to a reporting 
server running on a virtual machine for further analysis. The data are extracted via 
SQLite for Dionaea and Mysql for kippo.  
 
3. Findings : Dionaea 
This honeypot was hosted from a local Internet service provider link, with a total 
of 115,882 IP connections to the honeypot. The data was collected over a period 
of 97 days, from 25 Oct 2013 to 30 Jan 2014. 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of targeted ports on the Dionaea honeypot. The 
highest number of hits (77.52%) was on port 445 (SMB, the main protocol run by 
Dionaea). This is followed by port 139 (15.21%) and port 135 (5.21%). 
3.1 Breakdown of Attacks by Time of Day 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of connection over the 24-hour period. It was 
noted that connections followed a 9 am to 5 pm GMT+8, peaking at 12 pm and a 
sharp drip at 5 pm.  
This could be because more machines are connected online during a typical work 
day cycle.  
3.2 Breakdown of Attacks by IP Address  
Table 2 presents a breakdown of detected successful connections by IP addresses. 
Of the six countries associated with the top ten IP addresses, United Kingdom 
(UK) accounted for close to three-quarter of detected successful connections. It 
was noted that this result does not imply that there are more attackers from UK, as 
the IP address may be spoofed or belonged to a compromised computer based in 
the country. The spread of the different geo-location spread does, however, 
suggest that attacks could have originated from any part of the world.   
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Table 2 BREAKDOWN OF DETECTED SUCCESSFUL CONNECTIONS BY COUNTRIES 
(DIONAEA HONEYPOT) 
Connections IP Country 
58609 176.227.xxx.xxx United Kingdom, England, Gosport 
4957 2.95.xxx.xxx 
Russian Federation, Moscow City, 
Moscow 
4937 78.61.xxx.xxx 
Lithuania, Vilniaus Apskritis, 
Vilnius 
2972 186.89.xxx.xxx 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, 
Miranda, Petare 
2627 186.89.xxx.xxx 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, 
Miranda, Petare 
2253 221.143.xxx.xxx 
Korea, Republic of, Seoul-t'ukpyolsi, 
Seoul 
1624 2.95.xxx.xxx 
Russian Federation, Moscow City, 
Moscow 
1334 93.183.xxx.xxx Bulgaria, Khaskovo, Khaskovo 
837 2.95.xxx.xxx 
Russian Federation, Moscow City, 
Moscow 
753 212.21.xxx.xxx Bulgaria, Grad Sofiya, Sofia 
 
Further analysis was carried out on the actual number of malware downloaded 
from the connections. As noted in Table III, although the top connection was from 
Gosport in United Kingdom (a total of 58,609 connections), there were only 962 
instances of malware download. The high number of connections could be for 
reconnaissance purpose prior to the delivery of the malicious payload. It was also 
noted that connections originating from Korea did not result in any malware 
download. Similar, these connections could be probing for specific information 
about the host prior to proceeding with an actual exploitation (which may not 
involve the use of malware). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Table 3 FURTHER ANALYSIS OF DOWNLOADS FROM TOP 10 CONNECTIONS BY 
COUNTRIES 
Downloads IP Country 
962 176.227.xxx.xxx United Kingdom, England, Gosport 
2400 2.95.xxx.xxx 
Russian Federation, Moscow City, 
Moscow 
2425 78.61.xxx.xxx Lithuania, Vilniaus Apskritis, Vilnius 
1423 186.89.xxx.xxx 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, 
Miranda, Petare 
1271 186.89.xxx.xxx 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, 
Miranda, Petare 
0 221.143.xxx.xxx 
Korea, Republic of, Seoul-t'ukpyolsi, 
Seoul 
794 2.95.xxx.xxx 
Russian Federation, Moscow City, 
Moscow 
652 93.183.xxx.xxx Bulgaria, Khaskovo, Khaskovo 
413 2.95.xxx.xxx 
Russian Federation, Moscow City, 
Moscow 
358 212.21.xxx.xxx Bulgaria, Grad Sofiya, Sofia 
3.3 Malware Captured by Dionaea 
The majority of the captured malware from this honeypot were Conficker 
worm[15] exploiting the RPC vulnerability MS08-067 [16]. Figure 4 shows the 
breakdown of the different variant of Conficker worm captured. The presence of 
Conficker proved its resiliency since it was first discovered in 2008. For example, 
a report by F-Secure noted that one third of detected threats were attributed to 
Conficker[17]. 
4. Findings : Kippo 
The dataset was collected over a period of 483 days, between 18 Aug 2013 and 14 
Dec 2014. A number of 1,075,161 login attempts to the Kippo honeypot was 
recorded, and of which, 3,762 single unique IP addresses were logged. 
4.1 Top Ten Passwords Attempted 
Passwords are analogous to our key to a locked door, and weak usernames and 
passwords are often a vector that can be targeted by attackers to gain entry into the 
system. 
The most commonly passwords attempted were “admin”, and the different 
variants of "password" – see Figure 5. Other popular attempted passwords include 
common words (e.g. apple - 1706, pass - 1565, user - 1017), common names (e.g. 
David - 551, Peter - 316, Sally - 202), and common keyboard stroke (e.g. qwerty - 
2110, qazwsx - 2111, q!w@e#r$ - 71). 
The length of the passwords attempted generally ranged from six to nine 
characters (i.e. >50% of attempted passwords).  
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The two most commonly used username are root and admin. The former is the 
default username for Unix based machine while the latter is a commonly used 
username in routers or network devices. It was noted that oracle was among the 
top 10 username as it is a widely used database. Our findings echoed studies such 
as [21,22]. 
Most organizations will not have a password policy that requires a long password 
[23], and various studies (see [24]) recent high profile breaches suggested that 
reusing usernames and passwords is not an uncommon practice among users. For 
example, a recent study found several hundred thousand leaked passwords from 
eleven web sites that "43-51% of users reuse the same password across multiple 
sites" [25]. Based on the findings, the authors designed a ‘cross-site password-
guessing algorithm, which is able to guess 30% of transformed passwords within 
100 attempts compared to just 14% for a standard password-guessing algorithm 
without cross-site password knowledge’. Another recent study by Lu, Shuai and 
Yu [26] also demonstrated that it is relatively easy to identify online individual e-
commerce customers by using the customers’ username.    
4.2 Top Ten IP Connections 
The chart below outlined the top ten unique IP addresses visiting the honeypot, 
where majority of the IP connections were from Hong Kong and China. This is a 
similar observation reported by Cisco [18] but differs from recent studies 
undertaken by researchers from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki[19] and 
University of Ostrava [20]. In the first research, a Dionaea honeypot was deployed 
between 19 February and 11 March 2012, 28 March and 23 April 2012, and 21 
January and 19 February 2013. Similar to our research, Dionaea and Kippo 
honeypots were deployed. The top five attack countries varied between the three 
deployment periods in the first research. Unlike our findings, the top attack 
countries in both studies are dominated by European countries. This is, perhaps, 
due to the location of the deployed honeypots. 
 
4.3 Top Ten Successful Commands 
Kippo simulates a system with limited command line. It allows the pre-
configuration of username and password for login. In this setup, we used the 
default username "root" and password "admin" as the login username and 
password in order to gain a better understanding of attacker activities once they 
are logged into the compromised system. Such activities are captured in the 
database and allow real-time playback in as shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 9 listed the top ten commands executed when an attacker was connected to 
the system.  It was observed that the folder of interest appears to be /tmp, which 
stores temporary files that will automatically be deleted upon boot up. Attackers 
were observed to upload their artifacts or tools to the /tmp folder. The second 
most popular activity is the directory listing command, ls, which provides the 
attacker an overview of the system file structure. 
4.4 Files downloaded 
There were a total of 93 unique files downloaded as shown in Figure 10. We 
observed that a majority of the binaries are designed for 32-bit executables on 
MIPS or Intel platform.  A handful of the captured binaries were compiled for 
ARM chipset.  
Further analysis of the captured malware shows that a significant number of the 
binaries were designed to conduct denial of service attacks. The other popular 
captured malware were backdoors targeting Linux platform, which reflects the 
trend highlighted in the 2014 McAfeee Labs Threat Report [27]. 
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5. A conceptual EASY training model 
Most major corporations would have existing information security awareness and 
education training in place. The design of such training could be customized for 
individual corporate, although it would generally consist of three basic building 
blocks, namely: Awareness, Training and Education [28].  
 Awareness typically begins with ensuring all employees within the 
organization with the basic cybercrime understanding and the importance of 
information security, generally achieved via ongoing training and education – 
the other two building blocks.  
 During training, participants (e.g. employees) will be taught relevant and up-
to-date skills and competencies in order to contribute to a culture of security 
within the corporate.  
 As aptly summarized in [29], education integrates all essential skills and 
relevant competencies into a common body of knowledge for information 
security specialists and professionals.  
 
Figure 11 describes the relationship between the three building blocks.  
Enhancing or improving information security management in corporate has been 
studied by researchers. For example, Nersen, Rana, Mumtaz [30] identified 
several factors that could be included in awareness and education training. In 
another recent work, Martini and Choo [31] explained how the Situational Crime 
Prevention, a criminology theory, can be used as the underlying theoretical lens in 
the design of cybersecurity courses.  
The Routine Activity Theory [32] is another popular criminology theory that has 
been widely used to study cybercrime. The theory states that for crime to occur, 
there must be three elements, namely a person motivated to commit the offense, a 
vulnerable victim who is available, and insufficient protection to prevent the 
crime.  The theory draws on rational exploitation of ‘opportunity’ in the context of 
the regularity of human conduct to design crime prevention strategies, especially 
where terrestrial interventions are possible. Therefore, to reduce the probability of 
the occurrence of a crime, we would need to 
 Increase the effort required to offend; 
 Increase the risk of getting caught; and/or 
 Reduce the rewards of offending. 
 
Our proposed Engaging Stakeholders, Acceptable Behavior, Simple Teaching 
method, Yardstick (EASY) training model can be used with the Routine Activity 
Theory to design training activities, which will increase the effectiveness of 
security awareness training and enhance the security culture within the corporate – 
see Table 4. 
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Table 4 APPLYING ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY TO THE CONCEPTUAL EASY 
MODEL  
EASY Model Routine Activity Theory 
Increasing the 
effort required 
to offend 
Increasing 
the risk of 
getting 
caught 
Reducing the 
rewards of 
offending 
Engaging Stakeholders 
Engage senior management 
support 
Yes Yes  
Engage employee 
(including contractors and 
vendors) 
Yes Yes  
Engage with industrial 
partner s 
Yes Yes  
Acceptable Behavior 
Reward Good User 
Behavior  
Yes  Yes (particularly 
for insider-related 
threats) 
Improved social support   Yes  
Improved feedback and 
assistance  
 Yes  
User ownership in detection 
and suspected incidents, 
compromises or anomalies 
Yes Yes  
Simple Teaching Method 
Explore effective training 
methods 
Yes   
Scalable and cost effective  Yes  
Yardstick 
Measurement  through 
assessment 
Yes   
Multiple channel feedback Yes   
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We now explain the four pillars of the model, as well as how honeypot data can 
be used in the model.  
5.1 Engaging Stakeholders 
A successful security awareness program requires commitment and support of all 
stakeholders, including senior management (e.g. the C-level executives). For 
example, a committed supportive senior management team who is able to lead by 
example (e.g. active participants in corporate training activities) will reinforce the 
importance of information security and set the right tone in ensuring a healthy 
security culture within the corporate. In addition, a clearly committed senior 
management will help ensure that the corporate’s information security training 
program is adequately funded and implemented. 
Employees are generally the front-line of information security threats and, 
therefore, active participation from employees will play a key role in early 
detecting and mitigation of information security threats (e.g. reporting of 
abnormalities which will lead to follow-up investigation and formulation of 
mitigation strategies). This would significantly increase the effort for an attacker 
to gain entry, or increase the risk of detection. Security incident response teams 
should also consider join global alliances, such as Anti-Phishing Working Group 
(APWG) and Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), to 
facilitate timely sharing of information to better combat security threat. 
Traditionally, security awareness training materials are delivered using 
presentation slides and e-learning platform, which are generally non-engaging and 
information may not be up-to-date. The use of honeypot data could contribute to 
this gap.  
In our model, we propose using interactive tools such as data visualization tools, 
as the latter has been shown to be an effective way to positively influence user 
[33]. Using real data collected from honeypots, materials delivered using data 
visualization tools can help ensure employees have an up-to-date and in-depth 
understanding of attacker trends. For example, the top attacks ports collected from 
both honeypots would allow participants to understand: 
 Attack vectors targeted by attackers (e.g. see Figures 2 to 4, and 10); 
 Attack origins and time of attacks (e.g. see Figure 3 and Tables 2 and 3); 
 Commonly attempted username and password combinations (e.g. see 
Figures 5 to 7); and 
 Attacker activities on the system (e.g. see Figures 8 and 9). 
Such information would also allow the corporate to identify their vulnerable 
systems that can be exploited and ensure appropriate security measures are in 
place (e.g. turning off services that are not required to reduce the exposure). 
Employees would also be able to understand that attacks do not originate from 
one country or region, and attacks can originate from countries as far as Lithuania 
(in the context of the honeypot setup in this study). In addition, honeypot data 
would provide employees with up-to-date information on malware trends (e.g. 
what are the current malware targeting the corporate). 
Honeypot data could also be used to provide senior management with an overview 
of the threat landscape (e.g. via a honeymap) as well as a real-time data 
visualization attack traffic to demonstrate how corporate systems are being 
targeted by attackers located in different places around the world (see Figure 12).  
5.2 Acceptable Behavior 
An important element to ensure the success of a security awareness initiative is to 
inculcate the correct user behavior towards information security. Every employee 
has their specific role and responsibilities within the company. We need to build a 
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culture of ownership towards the responsibility of security among all employees. 
This could start with equipping employee with a good understanding of current 
cybercrime threats and trends (e.g. information about the latest phishing scam 
which may results in employee system being compromised or their account 
credentials phished), the potential impact of a security breaches, and mitigation 
strategies.  
Employees should also be educated about the importance of taking personal 
responsibility and ownership to ensure a secure environment and adopt cyber 
hygiene practices (e.g. not sharing username and password). This is also 
consistent with the Australian Government information security manual, which 
emphasized the importance of ensuring employees are familiar with their roles 
and responsibilities, understand and support security requirements, and learn how 
to fulfill their security responsibilities [35]. 
Employee could be motivated using an appropriate reward system for employees 
demonstrating competency and walking the talk on security best practices. For 
example, we could organize campaign to publicly identify the ‘most information 
security aware employee of the month’ who demonstrates such values through 
nomination. We could also incorporate the use of honeypot to influence user 
behavior. For example, we could demonstrate to end user how rapidly malware 
could infect Dionaea honeypot when it is connected to the internet and provide 
preview through the playback action of what was done by attacker upon intrusion. 
We attempt to immerse user through live "hack" scenario and this could enrich 
user learning experience which was not found in conventional awareness training 
programme. 
Insider abuse has been the subject of academic research in the last few decades, 
but remains a concern area to corporates and governments. For example, Verizon 
data breach report 2014 [34] identified that the third most frequent data breach 
was caused by insider misuse. One deterrence strategy against insider abuse is to 
publish anonymized audit findings, for example, findings of unauthorized access 
by employees, to raise awareness and deter future offending. In addition, 
corporates should consider introducing employee counseling initiatives that 
include avoiding having disgruntled employee carrying out malicious act. This is 
enhanced by providing appropriate social support within employee to establish a 
positive environment condoning bad behavior and allow appropriate feedback 
channel for whistle blowing. 
Security is often being regarded as the responsibility of the information 
technology and information security division within the corporation. Given the 
limited resources and wide threat surface, there are multiple entry points to a 
corporate system that can be exploited by cybercriminals. Therefore, it is 
important to put in place reporting requirements for employees to report detected 
and suspected incidents, compromises or anomalies. In addition, having an 
established corporate communication channel (e.g. an online incident reporting 
platform) and documentation of security best practices will enhance employee 
information security awareness and knowledge, and this could be reinforced using 
mock exercises with up-to-date data collected from honeypots. 
5.3 Simple Teaching method 
Senior stakeholders in the organizations need to understand the importance of the 
right governance enablers and more importantly, to understand that information 
security is not only a cost or an IT issue, but it can facilitate economic exchange 
and deliver real business benefits. It is important for senior stakeholders in the 
organizations to be able to answer questions such as  
 12 
1. Who would benefit from having access to our information and systems? 
2. What makes us secure against security threats? 
3. Is the behaviour of my staff enabling a strong security culture? 
4. Are we ready to respond to an information security incident? 
5. What would a serious information security incident cost our corporate? 
6. How much effort will be needed to mitigate and recover from a serious cyber 
security incident? 
The teaching method of the security awareness training must be simple and easy 
to use. Common methods include classroom-based, computer-based e-learning, 
and video-based learning, each requires different considerations on cost and 
scalability – see Figure 13. 
It is also recommended that corporates consider putting classroom-based security 
training for new employees, and re-enforcement training be delivered via video 
and/or e-Learning based. Regardless of the delivery method, the principle of the 
teaching method should be simple, direct to the point and easily understood by 
user with different background. Avoid using technical jargons and terminologies, 
which may not be easily understood by the employee. As previously explained, 
the training materials could be reinforced using live examples (e.g. live captured 
activities from the honeypot) to walk participants through the different aspect of 
security best practices.  
We also design a simple password checking application (see Figure 14) where 
participants could key in their password to check against the data collected from 
the honeypots and other known sources (e.g. known databases of compromised 
username and passwords) whether their password is one of those commonly 
attempted by attackers. This is a simple and cost-effective way to self-assess 
password as well as reinforcing the importance of having a strong password. 
5. 4 Yardstick 
For any program to be successful, we need to be able to measure its outcome and 
monitor the progress. The monitoring should be done continuously so that gaps 
could be identified early and appropriate remediation could be applied. Therefore, 
an appropriate feedback channel should be established such that improvement to 
the security awareness training could be made. This could be provided in the form 
of questionnaire surveys, evaluation forms, interviews and focus group, and 
success criteria need to be established (e.g. employee attendance rate and minimal 
score to pass assessment test). 
 
6. Conclusion and future work 
Honeypot data can provide useful information which could be used in the 
understanding of attacker trends during employee information security awareness 
and education training. A better insight and knowledge of attacker trends will 
guide further responses at the operational level (e.g. effectiveness of existing 
controls), and contribute to management policy making and reform within the 
corporate. 
 At a strategic level, will inform and help senior management and other key 
stakeholders to reach a level of consensus and decide on broad strategies, 
policies and resources for the corporate in a timely fashion.  
 At the operational level, findings about existing and emerging patterns of 
network activities will support policy makers and other key stakeholders in 
their decisions about focusing scarce resources in the most effective way (e.g. 
effect change to harden the environment).   
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It is also likely that corporations would be more likely to share such data 
internally considering the non-sensitive nature of the data, thus, allowing all 
employees to have up-to-date intelligence and ensuring that appropriate controls. 
In this paper, we illustrated how the Routine Activity Theory can be used as the 
underlying theoretical lens to design an employee information security awareness 
and education training, which incorporates real-world attack data (collected from 
honeypots). This approach has the potential to raise information security 
awareness within an organization as well as establishing a culture of security 
within the organization, and consequently, increase the effort required to offend, 
increase the risk of getting caught and reduce the rewards of offending.  
Future work would include deploying honeypots in corporations and institutions 
in different countries located at different regions, as well as customized honeypot 
tools for specific security awareness themes (e.g. mobile security, web 
applications security, and industrial control system). We will also collaborate with 
like-minded researchers and practitioners to deploy our conceptual EASY model. 
This would allow us to receive practical feedback on the suitability of the various 
pillars in the model, etc, which will provide the basis for the best practice (and the 
library of training methodologies and tools) recommendations. Face-to-face 
interviews will also be conducted with relevant stakeholders to determine the 
feasibility of the refined model and library of training methodologies and tools.   
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